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We introduce a non-diffusive spatial coupling term into the replicator equation of evolutionary
game theory. The spatial flux is based on motion due to local gradients in the relative fitness of
each strategy, providing a game-dependent alternative to diffusive coupling. We study numerically
the development of patterns in 1D for two-strategy games including the coordination game and the
prisoner’s dilemma, and in 2D for the rock-paper-scissors game. In 1D we observe modified travelling
wave solutions in the presence of diffusion, and asymptotic attracting states under a frozen strategy
assumption without diffusion. In 2D we observe spiral formation and breakup in the frozen strategy
rock-paper-scissors game without diffusion. A change of variables appropriate to replicator dynamics
is shown to correctly capture the 1D asymptotic steady state via a nonlinear diffusion equation.
PACS numbers: 02.50.Le, 87.10.Ed, 87.23.Kg, 89.75.Fb
Evolutionary games provide a convenient and promis-
ing method for modeling the dynamics of selection and
competition in biological and social processes [1, 2].
While game theory at its origin focused on individual
strategic decisions in a game played once [3], time was
later introduced in terms of members of a population who
play repeatedly, and change their strategy according to
some rule [1], or equivalently in terms of changes in the
frequency of inherited traits or the genes that represent
them [4]. This dynamic approach has already shed light
on how group interactions can support traits that are not
obviously advantageous [5, 6].
One way to mathematically model the evolution of fre-
quencies of a given strategy within a population is via the
replicator equation [7, 8]. For strategies i = 1, ...,m, the
replicator dynamics for the ith strategy are defined by
dui
dt
= ui
[
fi(u)− f(u)
]
, (1)
where u(t) = (u1, ..., um) denotes the frequencies (num-
ber of players) of each strategy in the population with∑
ui = 1. The fitness of strategy i is written fi(u), and
the average fitness of the entire population is f(u). In
evolutionary games, the fitness of a strategy depends not
only on the payoff for that strategy, but also on the fre-
quencies of every other strategy in the population. If A
is the m×m payoff matrix for a symmetric game, then a
natural choice for the fitness function is fi = (Au)i, the
expected payoff for an individual playing strategy i, and
f = uTAu is the scalar average payoff for all strategies.
Diffusive spatial coupling or random mobility in evolu-
tionary games allows for pattern formation and gives rise
to interesting and rich dynamics; it can also support out-
comes not attained without the inclusion of spatial effects
[9–11]. For example, an evolutionarily stable strategy
(ESS) is one which cannot be invaded by another strat-
egy at an initially small frequency or population level [1].
However, it has been shown in a spatial setting that an
ESS can invade and replace another ESS via a diffusion-
induced traveling wavefront [12]. In public goods games,
unequal diffusion of strategies can promote cooperative
behavior by allowing the productive cooperators to ag-
gregate and coexist among the more rapidly diffusing
freeloaders, similar to a Turing instability [13, 14]. Other
approaches to introducing spatial dimensions into evolu-
tionary games include fixed individuals on a grid playing
against nearest neighbors [18, 19], or against randomly-
chosen neighbors while allowing for position swaps [20].
The inclusion of diffusive coupling in the replicator ODEs
corresponds to an assumption that all individuals in the
population wander randomly while changing strategies.
This means that the local flux of those playing the ith
strategy is given by Fick’s Law: Ji = −Di∇ui, with
Di the diffusion constant. What results is essentially
a reaction-diffusion system, where the “reaction” comes
from the competitive interaction between players [9, 10].
Once space is included, the frequency interpretation
of u no longer holds, because
∑
ui varies from point to
point; we can still treat u(x, t) as the vector of local popu-
lation densities, and ‖u‖1 ≡
∑
ui the total density (num-
ber of players) at (x, t). Following the approach taken
in diffusive evolutionary games by Vickers [9], we define
the fitness fi(u) = (Au)i/‖u‖1, the expected payoff for
strategy i, and the average payoff f(u) = uTAu/‖u‖21.
What if the players do not move randomly? A more
general transport law for spatial evolutionary games is
given by the following expression for the flux
Ji = −Di∇ui + βiui∇ [(Au)i/‖u‖1] . (2)
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2Here βi is the proportionality constant for the fitness gra-
dient ∇fi, which allows for the spatial movement of play-
ers in the direction of increasing payoff. Including a flux
of players moving in a profitable direction, as an alter-
native to changing strategies, is a sort of spatial version
of the replicator equation time dynamics. The same ap-
proach has been taken in modeling dispersal and spatial
distribution in ecology [21, 22]; a related idea was in-
troduced as “success-driven migration” in a prisoner’s
dilemma model on a grid [23], which has recently been
extended to model reputation-based migration [24]. Here
we use the flux in Eq. 2 to obtain the partial differential
equation (PDE) system:
∂ui
∂t
= αiui
[
(Au)i/‖u‖1 − uTAu/‖u‖21
]
− βi∇ · (ui∇[(Au)i/‖u‖1]) +Di∆ui, (3)
where αi is a proportionality constant for the game. The
derivation of the fitness gradient flux begins with the
assumption that the probability of a player moving is
proportional to the local difference between the fitness
at adjacent points in space [25]. In the continuum limit
this contributes a term ∇fi, which appears in the flux
multiplied by the local player density ui, proportional to
the number of players with fitness fi.
Here we present a study of the consequences of this
non-diffusive spatial coupling in several 2 × 2 and 3 × 3
symmetric games. Throughout this paper we will use
β1 = β2 = β, in other words we will not study the pos-
sibility of different flux coefficients of response to the
fitness gradient. Similarly we will take α1 = α2 = α
for the replicator term coefficients. We will however
allow for differences in diffusion, D1 6= D2. For con-
venience, we will use the following notation for 2 × 2
games: u1 = u, u2 = v,D1 = Du, etc. Our numerical
results were obtained with a fully-implicit scheme using
a parallelized Newton iteration, on spatial grids of 256 to
4048 points (1D) or 256 × 256 points (2D). Semi-implicit
schemes are frequently employed in reaction diffusion sys-
tems, allowing the nonlinear reaction to be handled ex-
plicitly [15]. Since the spatial derivatives in our system
are nonlinear, an implicit treatment of the nonlinearity
cannot be avoided.
To study the effects of the fitness gradient flux on pre-
viously known results, we compare with phenomena ob-
tained by Hutson and Vickers in the setting of a pure
coordination game in one dimension [12]; we find that
the fitness gradient flux modifies their results strikingly.
In a pure coordination game, strategies prefer their own
type, as is evident from its payoff matrix A =
[
a11 0
0 a22
]
.
If a22 > a11, it would be more advantageous for the pop-
ulation to play the 2nd (v) strategy, nonetheless a pop-
ulation uniformly playing the u strategy is known to be
stable (ESS), and cannot be invaded by a small popula-
tion playing the other strategy. In fact each pure strat-
egy is evolutionarily stable [27]. However, Hutson and
Vickers proved that diffusive coupling can produce trav-
elling wavefronts, whereby a population v invades u when
a22 > a11 [12]. The initial conditions they considered
were two adjacent regions of pure strategy dominance
with no overlap (our initial conditions will be smooth
functions with a small overlap, see e.g. Fig. 1a). In this
adjacent region geometry, diffusion initiates replicator
dynamics as the sharp initial population distributions re-
lax and overlap with time. Depending on the diffusion
constants, a local increase or bump in u (Dv > Du) or v
(Du > Dv) occurs at the region boundary in the travel-
ling wave solution [12].
The fitness gradient flux adds spatial gradient terms
which may modify existence or other properties of these
solutions. From a qualitative standpoint, the diffusive
flux between the adjacent region can now be enhanced
or opposed by the fitness gradient flux. Generally, the
PDEs in Eq. 3 can be shown to be normally parabolic
[26], and thus well-posed for β values such that
0 ≤ β < 4DuDv
Dv(a11 − a12) +Du(a22 − a21) ≡ βc; (4)
in other words, for strong enough diffusion. The equation
has smooth solutions in this range of β, but solutions
blow up as β approaches βc [16, 17].
We numerically simulate Eq. 3 for a coordination game
with Du = 1, Dv = 3, α = 1, and payoff matrix A =[
1 0
0 2
]
, in which case βc = 2.4. We study Hutson-Vickers
solutions in an adjacent region geometry for β < βc, and
find that the travelling wave continues to exist for β > 0,
t = 0 t = 0.2
t = 4.9 t = 8.0
0
1.0
2.0
0
1.0
2.0
-75 0 50 -75 0 50
u
v
FIG. 1. Spatial dynamics of a travelling wave in the adjacent
region geometry for a coordination game with payoff matrix
given in text, α = 1, Du = 1, Dv = 3, and β = 0.2. Times
shown are as labelled.
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FIG. 2. Effects of the fitness gradient flux on fully developed
travelling wave solutions in the coordination game: a) u(x, t),
b) v(x, t) at t = 390.2, for initial conditions in the adjacent
region geometry as in Fig. 1. Here Du = 1, Dv = 3, and
α = 1; values of β as labelled. Note that for both β = 1 and
2, the solutions have reached a steady state (speed c = 0).
albeit with the observed speed of translation c reduced.
An example of the development of such a travelling wave
solution is shown in Fig 1, for β = 0.2. Note that a bump
is still observed in u, corresponding to the conditionDv =
3 > Du [12]. As β is increased, the wave speed c of these
solutions appears to decreases linearly with β (for β =
0.1− 0.6), and stops entirely for β ≥ 0.7, see Fig 2. For
those cases with c = 0, the wavefront develops initially,
but the invasion is halted and the solution achieves a
steady state (β = 1 and 2 in Fig 2).
Moreover, we observe similar travelling wave solutions
numerically in the prisoner’s dilemma game, which was
not considered in [12]. An example is shown in Fig. 3,
t = 0 t = 0.2
t = 4.9 t = 8.0
0
0.5
1.0
0
0.5
1.0
-16 -10 0 6 -16 -10 0 6
u
v
FIG. 3. Spatial dynamics of a travelling wave in the adjacent
region geometry for a prisoner’s dilemma game with payoff
matrix given in text, α = 1, Du = Dv = 0.1, and β = 1.
Times shown are as labelled.
t = 0 t = 1.0 t = 4.0
0
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FIG. 4. Top row: 1D spatial dynamics of a random mode per-
turbation of u and v for a prisoner’s dilemma game with no re-
action or diffusion, showing the progress towards a structured
steady state, times as labelled. Bottom row: corresponding
evolution of the proportionate variable u˜(x, t). Here κ(A) = 1
(see text).
for A =
[
1 −1
3 0
]
and β = 1. This is quite different from
the purely diffusive coupling case (β = 0), for which no
travelling waves are seen. Instead, the system progresses
towards the only Nash equilibrium of the game (everyone
defects, which is also an ESS) [27], with dynamics essen-
tially unmodified by the spatial coupling. The travelling
wave which occurs with the inclusion of fitness gradient
flux may be caused by the directed motion of coopera-
tors, who can now flee in front of the takeover of defec-
tors. We do not yet know if these observations for the
prisoner’s dilemma game will correspond analytically to
the travelling wave solutions in the coordination game
[12].
We next consider the dynamics of 2-strategy games in
one-dimension and study the fitness gradient flux in the
no reaction, no diffusion case (αi = 0 and Di = 0 in
Eq. 3). This corresponds to a situation in which players
who cannot change strategy, but may nonetheless move in
order to improve their benefit—their strategy is “frozen”.
The dynamics still depend on the properties of the payoff
matrix A through the fitness gradient flux in Eq. 3, which
provides a game-dependent spatial coupling.
We find numerically that for certain classes of games,
characterized by a simple condition on the matrix A dis-
cussed below, the frozen strategy assumption leads to a
spatially structured steady state. An example is shown
in Fig. 4 for random initial conditions in the prisoner’s
dilemma game, A =
[
1 −1
3 0
]
. Note that this steady state
does not represent the coexistence of opposing strategies
in the usual sense (cooperation), because by assumption
players are not allowed to change strategy.
To begin to understand this steady state, we let u1 =
4u, u2 = v, and define the proportionate variable
u˜(x, t) ≡ u(x, t)‖u‖1 =
u(x, t)
u(x, t) + v(x, t)
,
with a similar definition for v˜(x, t). Because u˜ + v˜ =
1 at each point, only one of these variables is needed.
However, we do not obtain a new PDE purely in terms
of u˜. Defining p(x, t) = ∇u/(u+ v), we obtain
∂tu˜ = L(u˜, p, A) · ∇u˜+ κ(A) D˜ u˜(1− u˜)∆u˜, (5)
where L is a nonlinear function, D˜ > 0 is a constant, and
for payoff matrix elements aij , the constant
κ(A) ≡ a12 + a21 − (a11 + a22)
controls the spatial dynamics [26]. For κ(A) < 0, Eq. 5
is ill-posed as a backwards heat equation, which corre-
sponds to cooperators aggregating faster than defectors
can follow as the solutions blows up in finite time. For
cases with κ(A) > 0, we find that solutions evolve to a
steady state defined by ∇u˜ = 0, which defines a steady
state solution to Eq. 5 - an example is shown in Fig. 4.
It is interesting to consider solutions to Eq. 5 in ref-
erence to the classification of two-strategy matrix games
proposed by Szabo´ & Fa´th (Sect. 2.4 in [27]):
1. Anti-coordination class: games with a11 < a21 and
a22 < a12. The coefficient κ(A) > 0 for all games in
this class and the system evolves to a steady state
as each population locally adjusts to the relative
benefit between its own type and the other.
2. Coordination class: games with a11 > a21 and
a22 > a12, so κ(A) < 0. Under the fitness gra-
dient flux, populations will seek to aggregate by
strategy type. Well-posedness in this case can only
occur in the presence of diffusion, with sufficiently
high coefficients equivalent to the β < βc condition
discussed above.
3. Pure-dominance class: games with (a11−a21)(a22−
a12) < 0. The coefficient κ(A) can be of either
sign here, so well-posedness depends on the specific
choice of A, sufficiently high diffusion, or other as-
sumptions. In the prisoner’s dilemma, cooperators
u aggregate locally, while defectors v follow them.
If A is chosen so that κ(A) > 0, as in Fig. 4, then
the system evolves toward a steady state - the local
aggregation of u into four peaks is readily apparent
in that case. For games with κ(A) < 0, the PDE is
ill-posed.
Three strategy games allow for the possibility of cyclic
dominance of strategies [28], where any given strategy
can be beaten by another. We investigate the dynamics
of the three strategy rock-paper-scissors game [28] un-
der the frozen strategy assumption, defined by the payoff
matrix
A =
 0 −1 11 0 −1
−1 1 0
 . (6)
We observe spiral waves in this system, as shown in
Fig. 5 with periodic boundary conditions; spiral waves
in the rock-paper-scissors games are reported elsewhere
for other spatial couplings [20, 29]. Because it is difficult
to represent all three strategy populations on a single
plot, we use the following normalized version of the ad-
ditive RGB color system. We first assign a color to each
strategy; at each (x, t), the u, v, w values are normalized
such that the minimum is 0, the maximum is 1, and the
other is in the closed interval [0, 1]. These numbers de-
termine the RGB value for that point [30]. The result is
an image indicating which strategy is predominant, and
the relative proportion of the other two (an example of
a single strategy concentration field for a spiral wave is
shown in Fig. 6d).
The initial conditions consist of a superposition of
Gaussian bumps for each strategy population, of the form
ui(x, 0) = Cie
−Ki(x−xi)2 + 1, i = 1, 2, 3 (7)
FIG. 5. Spiral pattern in the frozen-strategy rock-paper-
scissors game, showing its full extent at t = 5.0; strategy
fields u, v, w are shown in an additive RGB color map (see
text). The inset shows a closeup of the initial conditions.
5FIG. 6. Development of a spiral pattern, for times a) t = 0.5,
b) 1.6, c) 3.0, with strategy fields shown in an additive RGB
color map; d) corresponding heat map plot for one individual
strategy u1(x, t) is shown, also at t = 3.0.
To produce a spiral pattern, the points xi are placed
symmetrically on a circle of radius r about the origin [26].
In Fig. 5, r = 2 with Ki = 5 and Ci = 1 for all i (256
x 256, periodic boundary conditions, ∆t = 0.01). Spiral
formation is determined by the proximity and magnitude
of these bumps, via the parameters r and Ci. For fixed
Ci, there is a range r1 < r < r2 where spiral formation
is orderly and persists until boundary effects cause it to
break up; this breakup is already evident at the edges
of Fig. 5. An example of spiral development is shown
in Fig. 6a-c. The pattern rotates as the three Gaussian
bumps chase each other, driven by the fitness gradient
flux, and density waves are radiated forming the spiral
arms. When the initial bumps are close (small r), the
spiral forms right away, but breaks up before it reaches
the boundaries. If the bumps are further apart (large r),
formation proceeds more slowly, and is incomplete before
the pattern is complicated by boundary effects [26].
To test the robustness of the spiral to asymmetric ini-
tial conditions, we varied the size Ki of the Gaussian
bump for each strategy, and the payoffs by replacing the
±1 in Eq. 6 with values drawn from a uniform random
distribution on [0, 1]. While these changes introduced
some asymmetries, they did not stop spiral formation
from the three bump configuration.
Spiral waves are observed as a generic feature in
many reaction-diffusion systems such as the Belousov-
Zhabotinsky reaction [31, 32], the Fithugh-Nagumo equa-
tions [33], as well as in the amoeba system Dictyostelium
[34]. Here a rotating spiral results from specific initial
conditions, the cyclic nature of the rock-paper-scissors
game, and the flux in Eq. 2 which drives players to-
wards gain (e.g. scissors chases paper) and away from
loss (e.g. scissors flees from rock). We also note that
realizations of this game in nature, for instance the mat-
ing strategies of a California iguanid lizard [35], may be
well described by our mathematical hypothesis, as such
creatures cannot change their strategy.
The spiral is however not a completely robust solution
in our system – it is not an attractor for all initial condi-
tions. Fig. 7 shows a simulation at t = 5.0 of the frozen-
strategy rock-paper-scissors game, with random initial
condition: the superposition of Gaussian bumps in the
form of Eq. 7 centered on randomly distributed points
xj . We do not observe a spontaneous organization into
spiral waves, as is often seen in other systems [31]. Since
for all finite domains we have tested, a single spiral wave
eventually breaks up, Fig. 7 may be more characteris-
tic of the asymptotic state for this spatial game. The
complex pattern of predominant strategy distribution in
this rock-paper-scissors game does bear a striking resem-
blance to the orientation map of visual selectivity in the
primary visual cortex of the brain [36].
In this paper we have studied the effects of a fitness gra-
dient flux on spatial PDEs for evolutionary games with
replicator dynamics, comparing the effects of this new
20
10
0
-10
-20
-20 -10 0 10 20
FIG. 7. Disordered state in the rock-paper-scissors game, at
t = 5.0, shown in additive RGB color.
6term to diffusive coupling. We have seen numerically
that the fitness gradient flux can slow or stop travelling
waves in some cases, and lead to new travelling wave
solutions in others. We have also introduced a PDE sys-
tem with no diffusion and no strategy-changing dynam-
ics, and studied some of the patterns that result in this
frozen strategy case. The progression of initial conditions
towards some final pattern characterized by a constant
value of the proportionate populations ui/
∑
u remains
to be understood in terms of stability and basins of at-
traction. For frozen strategy dynamics in three strategy
games (here rock-paper-scissors), the mathematical con-
ditions for spiral stability and instability also remain to
be understood.
In considering the relative motion of cells in growing
embryos or tumors, a number of different aspects have
been included in mathematical models of spatial motion,
such as diffusion, chemotaxis, and differential adhesion
[37, 38], while game theory has been applied to some
competitive interactions [39]. In this context, the equa-
tions proposed here provide a way to combine motion
and competition among players (cells). Such a directed
transport may be more appropriate to spatial game the-
ory models of biological or social systems than a random
(diffusive) flux.
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